What Does ‘Misogyny’ Mean? New Paths for Understanding Misogyny

This is a post by Margherita Grassi (University of Barcelona).

If you look up the word “misogyny” in dictionaries and encyclopaedias, you will usually find definitions such as the following:

These definitions raise a number of questions. When we describe someone as misogynistic (and perhaps even consider whether we might ourselves be misogynists), what exactly are we identifying? Following the definitions above, we might ask whether that person hates women, or holds specific prejudices against them. But what does this actually mean? Must misogynists feel nothing but hatred towards women? What about disgust, anger, or desire? Can someone who hates women still seek their attention and want to be noticed by them? And what is the relationship between the personal hatred that some people feel towards women and the broader social systems that oppress women in their everyday lives?

These are all important questions. Although the word “misogyny” has a long-standing history within feminist literature (some examples are Germaine Greer, Andrea Dworkin, Marilyn Frye, and Joan Alison Smith), considerable confusion can arise when discussing the subject. This concerns not only who should be considered misogynists, but also the scope of the concept itself. In fact, several related concepts are often brought together under the heading of misogyny (like “patriarchy”, “sexism”, and “male chauvinism”). In The Politics of Reality, for instance, Marilyn Frye generally describes misogyny as hatred towards women. At the same time, however, she uses the term to refer to what she calls “the problem that has no name”, along with “sexism” and “male supremacism”.

More recently, Kate Manne proposed a new and compelling approach around the issue of what “misogyny” means. Her aim is, first, to make the concept of misogyny clearer and more precise. We need a concept that allows us to identify what – and who – is misogynistic. This would help us recognise misogyny in everyday life. Moreover, it would enable us to distinguish misogyny from related concepts used in feminist debate. For instance, which term is most appropriate to use when discussing a particular action? Is it misogyny? Sexism? Male chauvinism? Finally – and even more importantly, Manne seeks a concept that could accurately capture the relationship between misogyny and oppressive gender-based social structures.

To achieve these goals, Manne moves away from the idea that misogyny is primarily a feeling of hatred towards women. Instead, she understands misogyny as the mechanism that keeps women in subordinate positions by enforcing patriarchal norms and expectations. A woman who stays home and respects the constraints society imposes on her may receive protection and respect – or, at least, may seem entitled to have them. A woman who does not respect gender norms, such as an outspoken feminist, is more likely to encounter hostility from her peers. For Manne, misogyny is the “police force” of patriarchy, a sanction-distributing mechanism that rewards women who comply with patriarchal norms and punishes women who violate them.

Manne’s proposal has been remarkably successful. Her work in Down Girl and Entitled reignited public and academic discussion of misogyny and its social consequences. It gave the concept of “misogyny” new communicative and political force, showing both the need for and the effectiveness of her intervention. At the same time, Manne’s account has attracted several comments and criticisms. In this article, I focus on two aspects of Manne’s proposal that I find problematic.

Firstly, by adopting a reactive approach to understanding misogyny, her account risks undermining its ability to predict and denounce certain important forms of misogynistic violence. Not all misogynistic violence is a punishment for violating patriarchal rules. And, at the same time, complying with them does not always seem to make one more likely to receive rewards. Women can be subjected to violence even when they have not broken any rules, or even when they actively conform to patriarchal norms and expectations. In the article, I discuss the example of women who are raped while unconscious, for instance, after (voluntarily or not) ingesting drugs. I also examine women involved in far-right or “alt-right” movements. Although these women may promote and embody patriarchal values, they can still become victims of violence and humiliation, including at the hands of the men in their own communities.

Secondly, I argue that Manne’s account does not adequately address the affective dimension of misogyny. Emotions appear to play an important role in many explanations around misogyny and its manifestations. By placing the emotional aspect in the background, Manne’s proposal may overlook something that helps explain why certain actions and attitudes are misogynistic and why they come into being. To illustrate this point, I discuss in the paper the case of incels: individuals who describe themselves as “involuntary celibates” and who often express hostile attitudes towards women online, despite rarely displaying such attitudes in their everyday social reality.

Having examined these criticisms of Manne’s proposal, I formulate a set of desiderata for an adequate account of what “misogyny” should refer to. I argue that an adequate definition of “misogyny” should: (i) incorporate its structural explanation explicitly in its very definition; and (ii) treat its affective dimension as a core component. I show why meeting these desiderata would help improve clarity about the phenomenon we are trying to identify while also making better sense of women’s experiences of everyday misogyny.

To read more about this, check out my article, “A Novel Approach in Characterising Misogyny”, recently published in Hypatia.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/hyp.2026.10104. The article is freely accessible at this link.

Margherita Grassi is a PhD Candidate and a BIAP Predoctoral Fellow (Ref: CEX2021-001169-M) at the University of Barcelona. She is affiliated with the Barcelona Institute of Analytic Philosophy (BIAP) and the LOGOS Research Group in Analytic Philosophy. Her research interests encompass feminist analytic philosophy, philosophy of mind, social philosophy, and social epistemology.