Must There Be Something Fundamental?

On 29 January, 202516 December, 2025 By BIAP Research & Outreach ManagerIn Fundamentality, Grounding, Metaphysics, Ontological Dependence, Vicious Regress

This is a post by Markel Kortabarria (University of Barcelona).

It is a commonsense belief that reality is built from the ground up. At its base lie the fundamental building blocks that serve as a foundation for everything else. This belief is largely shaped by the dominant scientific view in physics, which suggest that every object is made up of fundamental particles. Philosophically, the view is reminiscent of the ancient atomism of Leucippus and Democritus, as well as Leibniz’s theory of monads—simple, indivisible substances that form the foundation of every other substance.

Is More Diversity Better for Public Reason?

On 18 January, 202516 December, 2025 By BIAP Research & Outreach ManagerIn Diversity, Liberalism, Political Philosophy, Public Reasons

This is a post by Andrei Bespalov (Pompeu Fabra University).

In liberal democracies, citizens must respect one another as free and equal partners in self-government. According to public reason liberals, the idea of civic respect entails that policies can be enforced by the state only if they are reasonably justified to all citizens. But what should count as a reasonable justification in a public whose members disagree with one another on the basic matters of morality, philosophy, and religion?

Stereotypes, Access to Justice and the Masking of Individuality

On 17 January, 202516 December, 2025 By BIAP Research & Outreach ManagerIn Jurisprudence, Philosophy of Law, Stereotypes

This is a post by Federico Arena (University of Girona).

When someone utter stereotypes like “Girls are not good at mathematics” or “Mapuches are usually drunk” we intuitively sense something wrong with what has been said. The reasons for the negative evaluation of stereotypes are linked to the varieties of harms that they may cause to the stereotyped people. Indeed, such statements often express inaccurate beliefs that are the result of the imposition to certain groups of discriminatory social relationships and inegalitarian hierarchies.

Epistemically Fundamental Sources of Self-Identification

On 17 January, 202516 December, 2025 By BIAP Research & Outreach ManagerIn Epistemology, Immunity to Error, Memory, Self-knowledge

This is a post by Manuel García-Carpintero (University of Barcelona).

Consider simple subject-predicate claims about ourselves such as “I once was in Athens”, made on the basis of watching what I take to be a photograph of myself in Athens. The claim might be wrong for all kind of reasons; say, that the photo has been tampered with, and it is not Athens what it shows. Now, developing suggestions by Wittgenstein, S. Shoemaker advanced a notion that he labeled Immunity to Error through Misidentification, to contrast the relatively low epistemic standing of a self-ascription like this with most of the more standard cases in which we refer to and make judgments about ourselves.