This is a post by Constant Bonard (University of Bern), Filippo Contesi (University of Cagliari) and Teresa Marques (University of Barcelona).
Propaganda is so ubiquitous a phenomenon in contemporary societies of all types that there would seem to be no problem in us understanding what it is. Still, we apparently continue to fall for it so often that perhaps we are not very good at recognizing it. It may be because we don’t really understand what propaganda is. Can the philosophical debate about how to define propaganda provide any help? Unfortunately, so far, philosophers have not arrived at anything close to a consensus.
Research on propaganda as a political form of mass communication started in the early 20th century with the work of such influential figures as Edward Bernays (“the father of public relations” and Sigmund Freud’s nephew) and Walter Lippmann. After WWII and the Holocaust, authors like Hannah Arendt or Victor Klemperer reflected about the effects of Nazi propaganda, which they suffered. In recent years, philosophers have started to pay increasing attention to studying the nature, mechanisms and effects of propaganda. Authors like Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky, Sheryl Tuttle Ross, Naomi Oreskes and Erik Cowen, or Jason Stanley, have been interested in the nature, language and epistemology of propaganda, as well as on its weighty moral and political dimensions.
In our recent paper, “The Defectiveness of Propaganda”, we review this literature, offer an account of (political) propaganda, and argue that it is a necessarily negative phenomenon. We do so against a recent strain of philosophical theorizing according to which propaganda can be a neutral or even a positive activity.
Classical theories of propaganda can be grouped into three categories: (a) those that characterize propaganda as an attempt deliberately designed by some individuals or groups to influence the opinions and actions of other individuals or groups without rational argument; (b) those that define propaganda as an attempt to influence public opinion by conveying falsehoods; (c) and finally, those theories that see propaganda as an attempt to persuade the public by arousing irrational emotions. Each type of theory faces problems and the search for an adequate account of propaganda is ongoing.
The definition of propaganda is such a contested issue that scholars disagree also about the normative status of the phenomenon, with some authors suggesting that it is not a necessarily negative form of communication, and others arguing that it is. Some authors have focused on the delineation of propaganda and related phenomena, such as disinformation, advertising, fake news, political rhetoric, and legitimate attempts at persuasion. For instance, public announcements of extreme weather events that recommend that a population evacuate a flooded area aim to persuade the target population, but do not appear to be cases of propaganda. Likewise, many forms of public education do not amount to propaganda (although public education can also sometimes be used for propaganda purposes).
After an exploration of the sense and connotation of the word ‘propaganda’ in ordinary use and in the scholarly literature, we discuss Sheryl Tuttle Ross’s original account of propaganda, where propaganda is understood as an epistemically defective form of political communication (an account which was in turn influenced by Noël Carroll’s earlier work on the neighbouring phenomenon of ideology). After suggesting some refinements of, and additions to, Ross’s view, we argue that, with those modifications, it proves an explanatorily useful analysis. This leads us to offer a definition in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions for something to count as propaganda.
Our account of propaganda as an epistemically defective form of communication may seem to be threatened by some recent claims that legitimate cases of public communication should count as propaganda. According to such claims, propaganda does not have to involve anything that is negatively connoted. We assess two prominent figures advancing such claims, namely Tuttle Ross’s more recent revision of her previous model and Jason Stanley’s influential account, and show that they do not falsify our definition of propaganda.
Against Ross’s recent revision, we argue that her revised account threatens to equate protest with propaganda, thus blurring important distinctions between different forms of political communication. Against Stanley, we point out that the two main case studies in support of his positive view of propaganda, i.e. Martin Luther King’s role in the Selma marches and Du Bois’s writings in defense of equality and freedom, do not provide sufficient evidence to falsify our account of propaganda as a necessarily negative phenomenon.
To read more about different theories of propaganda and our own account, check out our article, “The Defectiveness of Propaganda”, which appears in The Philosophical Quarterly, issue 74(4), October 2024.
A version of the article is also freely accessible here.
Constant Bonard is a postdoctoral researcher specializing in the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of language, working on various topics related to emotion, communication, or both (e.g. slurs, implicatures, speech acts, natural meaning, values, human-AI interaction, propaganda, music, emotional appeal). Currently, he is based at the University of Bern (Switzerland) as a member of the “Collective Guilt and Shame” project.
Filippo Contesi is an Assistant Professor (Ricercatore Tenure-Track) at the University of Cagliari. He is a cross-disciplinary philosopher of art, language and mind and has written on various issues in empirically informed philosophy of affects, aesthetics, propaganda and linguistic diversity.
Teresa Marques is an Associate Professor (Profesora Agregada) at the University of Barcelona. She is a philosopher of language, and has interests in metaethics, epistemology, and feminist and social philosophy. In recent years, she has been working on disagreement and retraction, conceptual engineering, slurs, evaluative language, and the expression of emotions in language.
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